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1 Introduction
As in all major industrialized countries the population of the United States is aging over time.
This process is driven by increasing life-expectancy and a decline in birth rates. Consequently,
the fraction of the population in working-age will decrease and the fraction of people in old-
age will increase. Based on population projections from the United Nations (2002), figure 1
illustrates the impact of demographic change on the population growth rate and the working-
age population ratio – the ratio of the working-age population (of age 20-64) to the total adult
population (of age 20-90) – in the U.S.. The working age population ratio decreases from 83%
in 2007 to 72% in 2075; the population growth rate is expected to decline from 0.9% per year
in 2007 to 0.5% in 2075.
Figure 1: Working Age Population Ratio and Population Growth in the United States
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These projected changes in the population structure will have important macroeconomic
effects on the balance between physical capital and labor. Specifically, labor is expected to be
scarce, relative to capital, with an ensuing decline in real returns on capital and increases in
gross wages. In the public debate it has been argued that better education could be an im-
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portant factor to compensate for this scarcity of labor. This paper analyzes how demographic
change affects the incentives to invest in human capital and the interaction between human
capital formation, economic growth, social security and the distribution of welfare. We show
that adjustments in human capital investments substantially mitigate the macroeconomic
impact of demographic change with profound implications for individual welfare.
The key mechanism at work in our paper is that scarcity of raw labor and abundance of
physical capital will lead to an increase of the relative return to education which, in a model
with endogenous education decisions, leads to increased human capital investment. That this
adjustment mechanism is indeed at work is supported by the indirect empirical evidence in
Heckman et al. (1998), who test an OLG model with endogenous human capital formation by
accounting for the U.S. baby boom, and the stylized fact that college attendance has increased
in the 1980s as a response to the increase in the college wage premium (Heckman and Carneiro
2003).
In order to quantify the effects of human capital formation in the aging U.S. society, we
develop a large scale OLG-model as an extension of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) model
with endogenous labor supply and educational decisions as well as endogenous growth. We
work out the differences to standard models without human capital by proposing three differ-
ent models with increasing degree of sophistication. We start with a standard model where
agents only make consumption-saving decisions and endogenously supply raw labor. In a
next step, we allow agents to invest time into human capital formation. Finally, we endoge-
nize growth by introducing a Lucas (1988) type growth mechanism through intergenerational
transmission of human capital.1 Throughout we address the role played by social security
1We exclusively focus on human capital accumulation as the source of long-run growth and do not consider investments
in R&D and technological innovations as in Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
their followers.
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in an aging population by analyzing how the policy evaluation of a social security system
with constant contribution rates is affected by the endogenous human capital formation. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the welfare consequences of demographic change across skill types that
emanate from the evolution of factor prices and therefore model intra-generational hetero-
geneity.2 As heterogeneity in human capital endowments and learning abilities at young ages
rather than shocks to human capital explain observed moments of income distributions and
account for up to 90% of the variation in total lifetime utility (Huggett et al. 2006; Huggett
et al. 2007; Keane and Wolpin 1997), we model intra-cohort heterogeneity through differences
across household types in initial stocks and type-specific learning abilities but abstain from
shocks to human capital.
The main finding of this paper is that endogenous human capital formation is an important
channel to adjust to demographic change. Including endogenous education decisions into the
model leads to profoundly different quantitative implications for the evolution of relative factor
prices and the resulting welfare consequences than the standard model with only physical
capital and raw labor. Welfare consequences from the increase in wages and declines in rates
of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 1% in lifetime consumption for newborns
in 2005 when contribution rates to the pension system are held constant. We also find that
newborn low ability agents experience slightly higher welfare gains than high ability agents.
In contrast, households that have already accumulated assets loose from the decline in rates
of return. Most importantly, we find that welfare gains are substantially higher in the human
capital augmented model relative to the standard model. The overall mass of agents alive in
2005 that benefit from demographic change increases from 11% to almost 40% when we move
from the standard model to the human capital augmented models. At the same time, the
2To this end we focus on the pure effects of changes in relative factor prices and not on skill bias of technological change
(Heckman et al. 1998; Aghion et al. 1999).
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maximum loss for middle aged agents decreases from −0.7% to −0.4% (−0.2%) in the model
with endogenous education (and endogenous growth). While we do not find that additionally
making growth endogenous has a large effect on relative factor prices in the period of the
demographic transition, endogenous growth leads to an increase of the long-run growth rate
of labor productivity by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points.
Our model borrows model elements from and contributes to several strands of the liter-
ature. Based on the seminal contribution of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) a vast number
of papers have analyzed the economic consequences of population aging, often paying par-
ticular attention to the pressure on social security systems. Important examples in closed
economies include Huang et al. (1997), De Nardi et al. (1999) and, with respect to migration,
Storesletten (2000). In open economies, Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2006), Attanasio et al. (2007)
and Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007), among others, investigate the role of international capital
flows during the demographic transition. We add to this literature by extending the standard
model to endogenous education and thus by analyzing a different mechanism through which
households can respond to demographic change. Since Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007) report that
the effects of openness on relative factor prices are small from a U.S. perspective, we work
with a closed economy model.
Our paper is most closely related to the theoretical work by de la Croix and Licandro
(1999), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Echevarria and Iza (2006) and Heijdra and Romp (2007)
on longevity, human capital, taxation and endogenous growth and the quantitative work
in Fouge`re and Me´rette (1999) and Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) who also investigate
demographic change in large-scale OLG models with individual human capital decisions and
an endogenous growth mechanism.3 We extend their analysis along various dimensions. We
3Similar models have been used by Hendriks (1999) and Bouzahzah et al. (2002) to address the effects of taxation and
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use realistic demographic projections based on the United Nations (2002) instead of stylized
scenarios. Our model also contains a labor/education-leisure trade-off. Thus, it can capture
effects from changes in individual labor supply, i.e. human capital utilization, on the return
of human capital investments. We calibrate our model such that it replicates realistic human
capital profiles over the life-cycle for different ability groups. Furthermore, we put particular
emphasis on the welfare consequences of population aging, both for different generations living
through the demographic transition as well as for different skill groups. To this end, our
model also contains intra-cohort heterogeneity with respect to initial human capital stocks
and learning abilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we construct a simple two period model
to illustrate the basic mechanisms at work in our quantitative model which is introduced in
section 3. Section 4 describes the calibration strategy and our computational solution method.
Our results are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Simple Model
In this section we develop a simple two period model with endogenous education decisions
and a PAYG financed social security system. We distinguish between two scenarios, one with
exogenous growth and another with a Lucas (1988)-type growth mechanism at work. The
setup is as follows: agents live for two periods, in the first period they choose time investment
into education, saving and consumption. In the second period they consume their entire
wealth and work a fraction ω of their time. The rest of their time (1-ω) they are retired and
other government policies on human capital formation and economic growth. Our analysis is also related to Heer and Irmen
(2007) who, in an otherwise similar setup as ours, analyze the role of endogenous growth through labor-saving technical
change.
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receive a lump-sum pension pt.
2.1 Household Optimization
Households maximize lifetime utility
max
cyt ,c
o
t+1
log cyt + β log c
o
t+1,(1)
with β being the discount factor and the superscripts y (young) and o (old) denote the two
periods of life. The sequential budget constraints are
cyt + s
y
t = (1− et)hytwt(1− τt)(2)
cot+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
y
t + ωh
o
t+1wt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1,(3)
where et is investment into education when young, h
y
t is the stock of human capital given at
birth, wt is the wage rate, rt+1 is the return on financial assets, τt denotes the social security
contribution rate, pt are lump-sum pension payments and s
y
t is savings. The present value
budget constraint is accordingly given by
cyt +
cot+1
1 + rt+1
= (1− et)hytwt(1− τt) + ω
hot+1wt+1(1− τt+1))
1 + rt+1
+ (1− ω) pt+1
1 + rt+1
.(4)
The education technology is
hot+1 = (1 + g(et))h
y
t ,(5)
with g being a function mapping educational investment into formation of human capital. We
choose g such that it is increasing, concave in e and fulfills the lower Inada condition. Solving
the maximization problem gives the usual Euler equation
cot+1 = β(1 + rt+1)c
y
t .(6)
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Solving for the optimal educational investment gives
g′(et) = (1 + rt+1)
wt(1− τt)
wt+1(1− τt+1) .(7)
Defining the education function g(et) in (5) as4
g(et) = ξe
ψ
t ,(8)
where ξ > 0 and 0 < ψ < 1, optimal education is determined by
et =
[
ωξψ
wt+1(1− τt+1)
wt(1− τt)
1
1 + rt+1
] 1
1−ψ
.(9)
It can be seen that educational decisions depend on the ratio of net wage growth to the return
on capital holdings and on the fraction of time working in the second period. The relevant
scenario in the presence of scarce labor and abundant capital is one with rising wages and
falling interest rates. This will induce an increase in education and an increase in the growth
rate of human capital.
Finally, households’ optimal consumption follows from combining (6) and (5) in (4) and
savings are accordingly given by
(10) syt =
1
1 + β
(
β(1− et)hytwt(1− τt)−
ω(1 + g(et))h
y
twt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1
1 + rt+1
)
.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce output using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α.(11)
At is the firm’s technology level, which, in the exogenous growth specification of our model,
grows with the gross rate of γA = 1 + gA. Competitive markets ensure that factors get paid
4In our quantitative model of section 3 we use the same functional form.
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their marginal products. We assume that capital depreciates fully after one period such that
1 + rt = αkα−1t(12)
wt = (1− α)Atkαt ,(13)
where kt = KtAtLt .
2.3 Social Security
The social security system is organized on a PAYG basis such that the budget is balanced in
every period which gives
(14) wt(1− et)hyt τtNyt + ωwthot τtNot = (1− ω)ptNot ,
where Nyt and N
o
t denote the size of the young and old generation. Without mortality risk
we have Not+1 = N
y
t and defining γ
N
t = 1 + g
N
t as the (possibly time varying) growth rate of
population it holds that Nyt = γ
N
t N
o
t .
Changes in the population structure γN require adjustments of the social security policy.
Let ρt denote the replacement rate (the ratio of pension income to average net wage income).
Then pension income can be expressed as
pt = ρt
(1− τt)wt ((1− et)hytNyt + ωhotNot )
Nyt + ωNot
.
Using the above in (14) and simplifying then links contribution and replacement rates by
(15) τt =
(1− ω)ρt
ω + γNt + (1− ω)ρt
.
It can be readily observed that τt increases in the fraction of pensioners, 1−ω, the generosity
of the pension system, ρt, and decreases in the population growth rate, γNt .
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2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear, households maximize utility and firms make zero profits. This
requires that
Kt+1 = s
y
tN
y
t(16)
Lt = Not h
y
t−1
[
(1− et)γNt γht + ω(1 + g(et−1))
]
.(17)
In the endogenous growth specification it is assumed that newborn generations inherit human
capital from older generations according to
hyt = µh
o
t = µh
y
t−1(1 + g(et−1)),(18)
with µ as the human capital transmission factor. Hence, the growth rate of human capital is
γht =
hyt
hyt−1
= µ(1 + g(et−1)).(19)
Note that in the endogenous specification of the model, the source of technological progress
is only learning (not learning by doing) and transmission of human capital. In the exogenous
growth model we set γht = 1 and A grows at an exogenously determined rate γ
A. Using (18)
and (19) in (17), we obtain
Lt = Not h
y
t−1
(
(1− et)γNt γht + 1 + g(et−1)
)
(20)
for the aggregate labor supply. Dividing equation (16) by At+1Lt+1, using (10) and (20) and
rearranging terms then gives the law of motion for capital per effective worker as
kt+1 =
α(1− α)β(1− et)(1− τt)
γA[(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τt+1)(1− et+1)γNt+1γht+1 + ω(1 + αβ)(1 + g(et))]
kαt .(21)
Furthermore, using (8) and (12) in (9) gives the optimal education decision as
et =
[
ωξψ
γA(1− τt+1)kt+1
α(1− τt)kαt
] 1
1−ψ
.(22)
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2.5 Steady State Analysis
The question of interest is how capital per effective worker, wages, interest rates and invest-
ment into education are affected by demographic change. To analyze this, we assume that
the economy is in steady state and vary the population structure γN . Note that γN is not
only the population growth factor but because of Ny = γNNo, it is also the ratio of young to
old, or, the inverse of the old age dependency ratio. Thus, by decreasing γN we simulate the
coming demographic change and can derive some qualitative predictions for our quantitative
model.
As we focus on steady states, we drop time indices. Here we assume that the replacement
rates adjusts and write the steady state relationships from equations (21), (22) and (15) as
k = Ω(e, γN , τ)
1
1−α(23a)
e =
[
ωψξ
γA
α
Ω(e, γN , τ)
] 1
1−ψ
(23b)
Ω(e, γN , τ) ≡
α(1− α)β(1− e) (1− τ)
γA [(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τ) (1− e)γNγh + (1 + αβ)(1 + g(e))](23c)
τ ≡ (1− ω)ρ
ω + γN + (1− ω)ρ.(23d)
Recall that
(24) γh =

µ(1 + g(e)) for endogenous growth
1 for exogenous growth.
A number of qualitative conclusions can be derived from these steady state relationships
(cf. appendix A.2 for details). First, for our scenario where τ is held constant, it follows that
(25)
∂k
∂γN
< 0,
∂e
∂γN
< 0
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for both the exogenous and the endogenous growth specification. Thus, the prediction of our
simple model is that in an ageing society we have to expect higher capital intensity and rising
educational attaintment. A higher share of older individuals decreases labor relative to capital
and therefore k will rise. In steady state, a higher capital stock per effective worker does not
affect the wage growth between two periods but decreases the interest rate.5 It then follows
from (9) that optimal educational investment will rise.
Second, we derive that
(26)
∂k
∂τ
< 0,
∂e
∂τ
< 0.
With increasing τ , savings will be crowded out and the physical capital stock will therefore be
lower. As a consequence of the lower capital stock, educational investment will also be lower
which can be directly observed from (9). This is the direct effect of higher taxation on k and
e.
Third, repeating the comparative statics of variations in γN from above and holding re-
placement rates constant (adjusting contribution rates), we can no longer determine the sign
of the partial derivatives in (25), because the direct effect of changing γN and the indirect
effect through adjustments of the contribution rate are of opposite sign and we cannot derive
which out of the two effects dominates. Numerically calculating steady states in the simple
model using reasonable parametrization, we however found that the partial derivatives in (25)
are smaller (in absolute values) in the case of constant replacement rates but still negative.6
We can therefore conclude that keeping the replacement rate constant and thus increasing
5To be precise, in the endogenous specification steady state growth will be affected by the design of the social security
system because the educational investment is a function of taxes. However, the argument from above is even reinforced in
the endogenous growth scenario because higher taxes lead to lower k, rising interest rates and less education. Thus, the
decrease in the incentive to invest in education is even stronger.
6These results are available upon request.
12
the social security contribution rate when γN falls, leads to lower capital intensity and lower
educational investment than in the scenario with constant contribution rates. Consequently,
this case also implies a lower long run growth rate than in the endogenous growth specification
of our model.
Finally, observe from (24), (23c) and (23b) that, in the endogenous growth model, the
time invested into education is a decreasing function of µ – the parameter capturing the
intergenerational transmission of human capital – because the effect of µ is mathematically
identical to γN (when we hold contribution rates constant). The insight that optimal education
decreases in µ can be interpreted on the grounds that µ is a measure for the degree of (positive)
externality of human capital. This intergenerational spill-over accelerates the growth rate
which in turn depresses capital per effective worker and raises interest rates. Furthermore,
notice that for γh = µ(1 + g(e)) > 1, educational investment will be absolutely lower in the
endogenous than in the exogenous growth model.
3 The Quantitative Model
In this section we introduce the quantitative model that we use to evaluate the economic
consequences of demographic change. We employ a large scale Overlapping Generations Model
a` la Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) with heterogenous agents. The structure of our model,
which we describe in detail in the following subsections, is similar to the simple model of
the previous section but we extend the simplified setup by endogenous labor supply and
heterogeneity of households with respect to the human capital technology.
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3.1 Timing, Demographics and Notation
Time is discrete and one period corresponds to one calender year t extending from t =
0, . . . ,∞. Each year, a new generation is born. Birth in this paper refers to the first time
households make own decisions and is set to real life age of 16 (model age j = 0). Agents
retire at an exogenously given age of 66 (model age jr = 50), i.e. the last year of labor force
participation is at age 65. The maximum life expectancy is set to 90 (model age j = J = 74)
and agents face survival risk. At a given point in time t, individuals of age j will survive to age
j+1 with probability ϕt,j where ϕt,0 = 1 and ϕt,J+1 = 0. Unconditional survival probabilities
are denoted by pit,j =
∏j
k=0 ϕt,k. The number of agents of age j at time t is denoted by Nt,j .
Since we introduce intra-cohort heterogeneity we use the additional index i to denote type
specific values.
3.2 Endowments, Preferences and Constraints
Each household of type i comprises of one representative worker who decides about con-
sumption and saving, supply of labor and educational investment. The household maximizes
lifetime utility at the beginning of economic life in period t,
max
J∑
j=0
βjpit+j,ju(ct+j,j,i, 1− `t+j,j,i − et+j,j,i), ∀i,(27)
where the period utility function u(c, 1−`−e) is a function of individual consumption c, labor
supply ` and time investment into formation of human capital e. β is the pure time discount
factor and pit,j denotes the unconditional survival probabilities. The per period utility function
is given by
u(c, 1− `− e) = 1
1− σ{c
φ(1− `− e)1−φ}1−σ, σ > 0 φ ∈ (0, 1),(28)
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where σ and φ denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the weight of consumption
in utility, respectively.
Agents receive income from working on the labor market, earn interest payments on their
savings and receive pension payments when retired. When working they have to pay contri-
butions τt to the social security system. The net wage income in period t of an agent of age
j and ability group i is given by
wnt,j,i = `t,j,iht,j,iw
g
t (1− τt) ∀i(29)
where wgt is the (gross) wage per unit of supplied human capital at time t. Here, we assume
that human capital is a homogenous input, i.e. human capital of different cohorts and types
are perfect substitutes.7
Due to age dependent survival probabilities agents leave accidental bequests. These are
confiscated by the government and returned to the households as lump-sum payments (trans-
fers) which we denote by trt. Transfers are the same for every living household and do not
depend on age or type. Accordingly, the dynamic budget constraint is given by
(30) at+1,j+1,i =

(at,j,i + trt)(1 + rt) + wnt,j,i − ct,j,i if j < jr ∀i
(at,j,i + trt)(1 + rt) + pt,j,i − ct,j,i if j ≥ jr ∀i
where at,j,i denotes assets, rt the real interest rate, trt are transfers and pt,j,i pensions in
period t, age j.
3.3 Formation of Human Capital
A key element of our model is endogenous formation of human capital via time investment into
education. There is a considerable amount of consensus in the profession about a reasonable set
7By the assumption of perfect substitutability we focus on the distributional effects of changes in relative factor prices
only and ignore potential effects of skill bias of technological change as analyzed in (Heckman et al. 1998).
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of production functions on the aggregate level. Unfortunately, there is a lot of disagreement as
to how knowledge is “produced”. In this paper, we adopt the functional form of the education
technology from Bouzahzah et al. (2002) which we already used in our simple model of section
2.
Households enter economic life with a predetermined level of human capital ht,0,i. Af-
terwards, they can work and invest a fraction of their time into acquiring additional human
capital. The education technology is
ht+1,j+1,i = ht,j,i(1 + ξie
ψi
t,j,i − δhi ), ψi ∈ (0, 1), ξi > 0, δhi ≥ 0,(31)
where ξi is a scaling factor and ψi determines the curvature of the education technology, δhi
is the depreciation rate of human capital and et−j,j,i is time investment into acquiring human
capital. The costs of investing into education in this model are only the opportunity costs of
foregone wage income. The growth rate of the human capital is given by
ght,j,i =
ht+1,j+1,i − ht,j,i
ht,j,i
∀i,
= ξie
ψi
t,j,i − δhi ,(32)
and is thus independent of the stock of human capital.
We understand the process of accumulating human capital as a mixture of knowledge
acquired by formal schooling and on the job or training programmes after schooling. A direct
implication is that “education” does not only refer to time spent in the formal school system
but has to be understood in a broader perspective. Human capital is accumulated only up to
an exogenously defined age jh and depreciates afterwards at a constant rate.
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3.4 The Growth Specification
As in our simple model of section 2, we consider two different growth specifications. The
exogenous model is specified by using a labor-augmenting form of technical progress
At+1 = At(1 + gA),(33)
where gA is the exogenously specified growth rate of labor productivity. The opposite sce-
nario that we look at is that technological progress in the long run is driven entirely by the
accumulation of human capital. Human capital is transmitted between generations according
to
ht,0,i = µζi
∑S2
j=S1
∑I
i=1 ht−1,j,iNt−1,j,i∑S2
j=S1
∑I
i=1Nt−1,j,i
, µ > 0, ζi > 0,(34)
where S1 and S2 determine the range of cohorts whose human capital is transmitted to the
new generations, µ is the human capital transmission factor and ζi determines the distribution
of initial human capital for a newborn generation.8
By this specification we assume that human capital is non-rival when it is transmitted to a
new generation.9 It is a public good that every agent inherits at the beginning of her life and
could be equally well interpreted as the average general skill level of the society (Lucas 1988,
p. 17). However, human capital is embodied in all individuals and is therefore rival (and can
be used exclusively by one person) when it comes to be utilized in the production process.
The parameter µ can be interpreted as the capacity of the society to pass on the avail-
able stock of knowledge embodied in the population to the next newborn generation. Put
differently, it proxies the ability of the educational system to disembody the human capital
8This specification corresponds to Lucas (1988) in a framework with finitely lived agents. Note that on the aggregate
level we do not incorporate average human capital into the production function (see section 3.5).
9This is why newborns receive an amount from average human capital and not a share from the total stock.
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of currently living generations. Human capital can grow without bound and is the source
of long-run growth. In the endogenous growth specification, we set gA = 0 and normalize
At = 1 ∀t.
3.5 Firms
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment and produce one homogenous good
according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α,(35)
where α denotes the share of capital used in production. Kt, Lt and At are the stocks of
physical capital, effective labor and the level of technology, respectively. Output can be either
consumed or used as an investment good. We assume that labor inputs of different skill levels
and ages are perfect substitutes and effective labor input Lt is accordingly given by
Lt =
jr−1∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
`t,j,iht,j,iNt,j,i.(36)
Factors of production are paid their marginal products,
wgt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
(37)
rt = α
Yt
Kt
− δ,(38)
where wgt is the gross wage per unit of efficient labor, rt is the interest rate and δ denotes the
depreciation rate of physical capital.
3.6 The Pension System
The pension system is a simple balanced budget pay-as-you-go system. Workers contribute
a fraction τt of their gross wages and pensioners receive a fraction ρt of the current average
18
net wages of the individuals of their own type. While pension benefits are lump-sum as in
a Beveridge system, the scope for intra-generational redistribution is limited by their type
dependency.10 The level of pensions in each period is then given by
pt,j,i = ρt(1− τt)wgt
∑jr−1
j=0 `t,j,iht,j,iNt,j,i∑jr−1
j=0 `t,j,iNt,j,i
. ∀i(39)
In our benchmark scenario we assume that the contribution rate is fixed and adjust the
replacement rate such that the budget of the social security system is balanced every period.
Hence,
τtw
g
t
jr−1∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
`t,j,iht,j,iNt,j,i =
J∑
j=jr
I∑
i=1
pt,j,iNt,j,i ∀t(40)
3.7 Equilibrium
At the beginning of every period t, households solve the maximization problem
Vt(at, ht) = max
ct,`t,et,at+1,ht+1
{u(ct, 1− `t − et) + ϕtβVt+1(at+1, ht+1)}(41)
subject to the dynamic and present value budget constraints.
Definition 1. Given the initial capital stock, average human capital and distribution of types
{K0, {h0,i}Ii=1,Φ0}, a competitive equilibrium are sequences of individual variables
{{{ct,j,i, `t,j,i, et,j,i, at,j,i, ht,j,i}Ii=1}Jj=0}Tt=0, sequences of aggregate variables {Lt,Kt, Yt}Tt=0, gov-
ernment policies {ρt, τt}Tt=0, prices {wt, rt}Tt=0 and transfers {trt}Tt=0 such that
1. given prices, bequests and initial conditions, households solve their maximization problem
subject to the dynamic budget constraint in (30).
10In the U.S. system, pension benefits are linked to individual monthly earnings which are indexed and averaged over the
life-cycle (Diamond and Gruber 1999). The replacement rate, however, is a decreasing function of monthly earnings such
that the earnings related linkage is incomplete. By ignoring this earnings related linkage, we overstate the distortion of the
labor-education-leisure decision induced by the pension system.
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2. Interest rates and wages satisfy equations (37) and (38).
3. Transfers are determined by
trt =
∑J
j=0
∑I
i=1 at,j,i(1− ϕt−1,j−1)Nt−1,j−1,i∑J
j=0
∑I
i=1Nt,j,i
.(42)
4. Government policies are such that the budget of the social security system is balanced
every period, i.e. equation (40) holds ∀t.
5. Markets clear every period
Lt =
jr−1∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
`t,j,iht,j,iNt,j,i(43)
Kt+1 =
J∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
at+1,j+1,iNt,j,i(44)
Yt =
J∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
ct,j,iNt,j,i +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt.(45)
6. The distribution of types in the economy is constant, Φt = Φ.
Definition 2. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which aggregate vari-
ables grow at the same constant rate and individual variables are stationary.
4 Calibration and Computation
In this section we describe the calibration of the parameters and the computational procedure
to solve the model. Our basic strategy is to specify the simplest model with endogenous labor
supply (but without educational investment) at the beginning and add model elements step
by step. We will occasionally refer to this first model as the “standard” model.11 Thus, we go
from the simplest and computationally easiest model to the most involved and computationally
11We termed it “standard” because almost all quantitative studies on demographic change discussed in the introduction
rely on physical capital only.
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most challenging one. Moreover, we redo all calculations for both pension system scenarios.
To meet our calibration targets, we re-calibrate the models for every specification.
Our “standard” model is the exogenous growth specification without educational invest-
ment. Agents make only labor supply and consumption-saving decisions. In a first extension,
we allow agents to invest into education but the rate of technical progress is still exogenous.
Finally, we switch to the endogenous growth model with education.
To calibrate the model, we take data from the U.S. and assume that the U.S. is a closed
economy. On the aggregate level, we take data from 1960 to 2004 from the National Income
and Product Accounts. The empirically observed wage profiles are calculated using PSID data
from 1968 to 1991. The calibrated parameters are summarized in table 1 below. Details of
our procedure are described in the following subsections.
4.1 Demographics
Population data are taken from and based on United Nations (2002). We use actual population
data from 1950 onwards and base our projections on UN estimates until 2050. Afterwards,
the forecasted values for the population until the final year of the simulation (2300) are based
on the procedure used in Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007).
4.2 Household Behavior
The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is set to 2, the pure time discount factor β and the
weight of consumption in the utility function φ vary across specifications (see table 1 with
parameters) and are calibrated to match the empirically observed capital-output ratio and
labor share, respectively.
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4.3 Ability Profiles
We endogenize education decisions of heterogenous agents such that model wage profiles result-
ing from human capital accumulation are consistent with empirically observed wage profiles.
We do this mainly through the choice of the parameter vector {ζi, ξi, ψi, δhi }Ii=1. We determine
these structural model parameters by indirect inference methods (Smith 1993; Gourieroux
et al. 1993).
The methodology to generate the type-dependent lifetime wage profiles closely follows
Fullerton and Rogers (1993) and Altig et al. (2001). We assume that individual wage profiles
for each type can be approximated by a third-order age polynomial,
wt,j,i = wteη0,ie(η1,i+g)j+η2,ij
2+η3,ij
3
(46)
where j again denotes age, i denotes the ability group and g is an exogenously given rate of
technical progress (here wage growth). The effect of age on individual earnings is given by
the values of the η coefficients.
We first regress the log of real hourly wages on age, age squared, age cubed, and interactions
between age and age squared with education, gender, marital status and a dummy variable
for a white agent.12 In the next step we use the coefficients from the previous regression to
generate a fictitious lifetime earnings profile for each individual.13 These profiles are used to
calculate the discounted present value of lifetime earnings by which we divide individuals into
three different ability groups. Individuals with high lifetime earnings are classified as having
12We use a fixed effect panel regression to isolate the individual effects like innate ability, motivation or other unobserved
characteristics that are constant over time.
13For this out of sample prediction we assume that education is constant at the highest level and the individual is married
if she was married at least once during the observation period. Hourly wages are replaced by the their fictitious values only
if they are not given in the data.
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high learning and earnings capacity.
Using these sub-samples we then run separate regressions of the form
logwj,i = η0 + η1,ij + η2,ij2 + η3,ij3(47)
for each ability group to obtain the group specific intercepts {η0,i}Ii=1 and the coefficient vector
−→η = {η1,i, η2,i, η3,i}Ii=1 which determines the slope of the age polynomial. Here, wj,i is the
de-trended real hourly wage rate.14 In order to exclude the problem of possibly different initial
assets of individuals, we use only labor income (instead of total income including income from
assets) and exclude all imputed observations. We further exclude observations with obvious
inconsistencies in education, age, etc., observations with less than 240 and more than 4000
hours worked per year15, the lowest and highest percentile in hourly wages and people with
less than 4 years of education.
Figure 2 presents the average hourly wages from the PSID used to recover the coefficients
for the three ability groups. Our coefficients (see table 8 in appendix A.1) and the shape of the
wage profiles are in line with others reported in the literature, especially with those obtained
by Hansen (1993) and Altig et al. (2001).
We next determine the structural model parameters of the human capital technology. First,
the group specific intercepts {η0,i}Ii=1 determine the relative human capital endowments for
a newborn generation. The parameters are calculated as ζi = eη0,i and re-scaled such that
the average newborn inherits µ human capital. As each ability group is weighted equally, we
thereby also determine the time-invariant distribution, Φ, of our model households. Second,
14In slight abuse of notation, we de-trend data by using the trend calculated from the sample and do not de-trend with
the value of g used below to calibrate exogenous technological progress in our simulation model.
15By excluding observations with less than 240 hours we exclude possible part time workers. The upper limit of 4000 hours
is usually seen as a maximum amount of possible yearly working hours. See also Altig et al. (2001)
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Figure 2: PSID Wage Profiles
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using data on wages simulated from our model, we run group specific regressions on the above
age polynomial. The resulting coefficient vector
−→ˆ
η = {ηˆ1,i, ηˆ2,i, ηˆ3,i}Ii=1 is a function of the
structural model parameters {ξi, ψi, δhi }Ii=1. Accordingly, the values of our structural model
parameters are determined by minimizing the distance ‖−→η −−→ˆη ‖, see subsection 4.7 for further
details.
Throughout, we set the maximum age for educational investment jh to 41, the peak of
the real de-trended hourly earnings of the medium ability group. This simplifying assumption
allows us to match the empirical patterns of the observed productivity profiles.16 Without
constraining jh in this way our parsimonious specification of the human capital technology
would not result in a decent fit to the data.
16The peak for the other two groups is 39 and 40. As this is close to 41, we do not introduce a different upper bound on
jh for each ability group.
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4.4 Growth Specification
In the endogenous growth model we set the exogenous growth rate to zero and calibrate µ
such that we match average GDP growth for the calibration period. We set S1 = 16 and
S2 = 90 and thereby assume that the knowledge of all citizens is used to produce average
human capital.
In the exogenous model we set µ to zero and use an exogenously given labor productivity
growth rate of 1.8% per year calibrated to match our data on TFP growth. This implies that
in the exogenous growth model all generations start with the same initial human capital.
4.5 Production
For the capital share in production, α, we take a value of 0.33 and assume that the depreciation
rate of physical capital δ is 4% per year. Both numbers are standard in the literature and are
therefore included as predetermined parameters.
4.6 The Pension System
In our benchmark scenario we fix contribution rates and adjust replacement rates of the
pension system. We calculate contribution rates from NIPA-data from 1950-2004 and freeze
the contribution rate of the year 2004 for all following years. Below, we also address the
sensitivity of our results by simulating a version of the model with a constant replacement
rate such that contribution rates have to adjust.
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4.7 Computational Method
We solve the model by assuming that the economy reaches a new steady state in the year 2300.
By that year, all transitional dynamics are completed by assumption.17 To get appropriate
starting values, we assume that the economy was in an “old” steady state until the year 1950.
For a given set of structural model parameters, solution of the model is by outer and inner
loop iterations. On the aggregate level (outer loop), the model is solved by guessing an initial
time path of the aggregate labor share, the capital-output ratio, the growth rate of average
human capital and bequests for all periods from t = 0 until T = 351. On the individual
level (inner loop), we start in each iteration by setting the terminal values for consumption
and human capital. Then we proceed by backward induction and iterate over these terminal
values until convergence of these inner loops. In each outer loop, disaggregated variables are
aggregated each period. We then update the sequences of the capital-output ratio, the labor
share, the growth rates of human capital and bequests until convergence. Updating of these
variables is by the modified Gauss-Seidel-Newton method developed in Ludwig (2007).
In addition, we solve for values of the structural model parameters by minimizing the
distance between the respective model simulated values of variables and their empirical coun-
terparts. In the most elaborate endogenous growth model we calibrate 12 parameters simul-
taneously to meet our targets on the aggregate and individual level. Values of all model
parameters are summarized in table 1.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our quantitative analysis. To develop intuition for
our results on the demographic transition, we first perform a comparison between an artificial
17In fact, changes in variables which are constant in steady state are numerically irrelevant already around the year 2250.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Growth Scenario Endogenous Exogenous
Education Yes Yes No
Preferences σ Relative Risk Aversion Parameter 2 2 2
β Pure Time Discount Factor 0.97 0.99 0.97
φ Weight of Consumption 0.78 0.81 0.70
Education ξ Scaling Factor 0.098 0.082 -
0.095 0.079 -
0.092 0.075 -
ψ Curvature Parameter 0.780 0.759 -
0.804 0.784 -
0.811 0.792 -
δh Depreciation Rate of 1.2% 1.2% 0.0%
Human Capital 0.8% 0.8% 0.0%
0.5% 0.5% 0.0%
ζ Initial Relative Human 1.46 1.46 1.46
Capital Endowment 0.94 0.94 0.94
0.60 0.60 0.60
Growth µ Human Capital Bequest Factor 1.38 - -
g Exogenous Growth Rate 0.0% 1.8%
Production α Share of Capital in Production 33%
δ Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital 4%
initial steady state and the final steady state of our model. As the old age dependency ratio is
higher in the final steady state, this comparison allows qualitative conclusions on the effects
of demographic change across specifications. Next, we turn to the analysis of the transitional
dynamics where we focus especially on the developments of major macroeconomic variables
for the period 2005 to 2050 across growth scenarios and perform a welfare analysis of the
effects of demographic change.
5.1 Steady State Comparison
In order to obtain some first insights into the long run effects of demographic change, we
here compare two different steady states. The thought experiment is to choose an artificial
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“base” steady state year (2005) and compare it to the final steady state year in the future
(2300). The exogenous driving force of the results is the increasing share of retirees and the
shrinking working age population between steady states. The comparison allows us to get some
intuition for the mechanics of the model as far as the qualitative effect of a different population
structure on the economy is concerned. Furthermore, the steady state comparison enables us
to perform a comparison across growth scenarios and thereby to examine whether the different
assumptions behind these scenarios lead to any significant differences in simulation outcomes.
All results in this section are derived by holding the social security contribution rate constant
at the 2004 level.
Table 2 compares some key variables for the two steady states. As a summary statistic
of the exogenous demographic variation across the two steady states, we report the old-age
dependency ratio which is at 17% in the initial steady state and at 32% in the final steady
state of the model.
Table 2: Steady State Results
Initial Steady State (2005) Final Steady State (2300)
OADR: 0.17 OADR: 0.32
Growth Scen. Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Education Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
K/Y 2.77 2.78 2.70 2.90 2.92 3.25
r 7.9% 7.9% 8.2% 7.4% 7.3% 6.2%
w 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.13 1.14 1.20
Y/AL 1.65 1.65 1.63 1.69 1.70 1.79
γY/N 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2% 1.8% 1.8%
` 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.71
Note: γY/N denotes the growth rate of per capita output.
The results shown in the table are in line with the prediction of the simple model and
we can draw a number of conclusions. First, in the standard model, as a consequence of the
decreasing working age population, the capital-output ratio in the final steady state settles at a
28
much higher level than the year 2005 steady state value. Interest rates are accordingly bound
to decline by a non-negligible amount and effective wages to rise. The difference between
steady state interest rates is at 2 percentage points.
Second, when we allow endogenous adjustment of education decisions but continue to work
with the assumption of exogenous growth, the capital-output ratio still increases but the effect
is much smaller than in the standard model. The difference between steady state interest rates
is now at 0.6 percentage points, more than three times smaller than in the standard model.
As derived in our simple model, relative shortage of the factor labor induces incentives to
invest in human capital which dampens the “pure” demographic effects on the capital-output
ratio. Our findings suggest that this effect may be quite large and that we may miss an
important adjustment mechanism to demographic change if we ignore endogenous human
capital formation.
Third, in the endogenous growth specification, the increase of human capital formation
implies a higher long-run growth rate of 2.2 percent relative to an initial level of 1.8 percent.
Accordingly, there will be large long-run welfare gains through the acceleration of human
capital transmission which is induced by demographic change. Despite this difference in
growth rates, almost no differences in capital-output ratios and interest rates to the exogenous
growth specification with endogenous human capital formation can be observed.
5.2 Transitional Dynamics
In this section we concentrate on the transitional dynamics and divide our analysis into three
parts. First, we analyze the behavior of several important aggregate variables. Second, we
investigate the welfare consequences of demographic change for households living through the
demographic transition. Finally, we look at the welfare consequences for generations already
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living in 2005.
5.2.1 Aggregate Variables
In figure 3 we show the evolution of the interest rate for the three growth scenarios.18 In the
standard model without endogenous education adjustments, the interest rate decreases from
an initial level of 7.4% in 2005 to 6.6% in 2050, a difference of 0.8 percentage points. This
magnitude is in line with results reported elsewhere in the literature, cf. Kru¨ger and Ludwig
(2007). In contrast, in the two models with education, the interest rate is expected to fall
by only 0.2% percentage points. As in our earlier steady state comparison, this difference in
the decrease of the interest rate between the exogenous and the endogenous growth models is
large, at a factor of about 3. Furthermore, observe that the decrease of the rate of return is
somewhat smaller in the endogenous growth model than in the exogenous growth model with
education. This is a consequence of the intergenerational spill-over of human capital which
increases effective labor, decreases the capital stock per efficiency unit and thereby stabilizes
relatively more the rate of return (cf. our discussion of the simple model in subsection 2.5).
In figure 4 we depict the evolution of aggregate labor supply shares as the number of
agents working relative to the total working age population. In the standard model, although
aggregate labor supply decreases, hours worked per worker increase such that the labor supply
shares increase slightly from roughly 68% to 70%. Accordingly, the substitution effect of
increasing wages is slightly stronger than the income effect. The increase of labor supply
shares in the two models with endogenous human capital formation is slightly less pronounced.
This is due to the existing trade-off between working, education and leisure in these models.
The difference between the two human capital augmented models can be explained by the
18Notice that level differences in the interest rate in 2005 across the growth/education scenarios are due to the fact that
our calibration targets are averages of the 1960-2004 period and not the year specific values in 2005. Such differences in
initial values can be observed in all following figures.
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Figure 3: Interest Rate
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endogenous growth mechanism. Because agents will invest less time into education in the
endogenous growth model (relative to the exogenous case), cf. the discussion of our simple
model in subsection 2.5, they will spend more time on the labor market.
Finally, we focus on the evolution of the growth rate of GDP per capita shown in figure 5.
When the U.S. aging process peaks in 2020, the growth rate of per capita GDP falls in the
standard model from an above steady state level of 2.4% in 2005 to a below steady state level
of 1.4% in 2020, a decrease by roughly 1 percentage point.19 In contrast, in the exogenous
growth model with education, the growth rate does only fall by 0.6 percentage points during
the same period. Recall that this is only a transitional effect because the long-run steady state
growth rates are identical in these two models. Endogenous growth does not alter the results
much compared to the exogenous growth model with education. Only after 2030 the growth
19The high initial growth rate is a consequence of the past baby boom.
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rate is relatively higher due to the positive effect of increased education on the human capital
received by newborns which ultimately leads to the relative increase of the long-run growth
rate reported in subsection 5.1. Growth rates of consumption per capita display similar trends.
Figure 4: Labor Share
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5.2.2 Welfare Effects
A household’s welfare is affected by two consequences of demographic change. First, her
lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase. Second, due to the de-
mographic transition, she faces different factor prices, transfers from accidental bequests and
replacement rates (or contribution rates) of the social security system than without changes
in the demographic structure. Specifically, households face a path of declining interest rates,
increasing wages and decreasing replacement rates, relative to the situation without a demo-
graphic transition. Additionally, in the endogenous growth model, households face different
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Figure 5: Growth of GDP per Capita
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stocks of initial human capital levels at the beginning of their life. Below, we focus on the
welfare effects for households already alive in 2005 for whom initial human capital levels are
taken as given. Our welfare calculations are therefore not affected by changes in the inter-
generational transmission of human capital.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second effect. For this we compare
lifetime utility of agents born and already alive in 2005 under two different scenarios. For
both scenarios we fix a household’s individual survival probabilities at their 2005 values. Of
course, they fully retain their age-dependency. Then we solve each household’s problem under
two different assumptions about factor prices, transfers and social security replacement and
contribution rates. When comparing welfare implications in different models, we use the
parametrization of the respective model that results from calibration.20
20One may object that we thereby evaluate welfare consequences using different sets of preference parameters across model
specifications. We do this because we have to recalibrate the model in order to meet our calibration targets (which results
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Let V¯t,j,i denote lifetime utility of an agent born at time t, age j and type i facing the
sequence of equilibrium prices, transfers and replacement rates as documented in the previous
section, but constant 2005 survival probabilities, and let V¯ 2005t,j,i denote the lifetime utility of the
same agent that faces prices, transfers and replacement rates that are held constant at their
2005 value. Finally, denote by gct,j,i the percentage increase in consumption (the consumption
equivalent variation) that needs to be given to an agent with characteristics t, j, i at each
date in her remaining lifetime at fixed prices to make her as well off as under the situation
with changing prices. Positive numbers of gct,i,j thus indicate that households obtain welfare
gains from the general equilibrium effects of the demographic changes, negative numbers mean
welfare losses. With our assumptions on preferences, gct,i,j can be calculated as
gct,i,j =
(
V¯t,j,i
V¯ 2005t,j,i
) 1
φ(1−σ)
− 1.(48)
Our first interest is in the numbers gct=56,j=0,i, that is, the welfare consequences for newborn
agents in 2005 (t = 56). These results are shown in table 3. We make several observations.
First, observe that newborns gain from the changing demographics in the standard model, that
is, the gains from increasing wages outweigh the losses incurred by decreasing rates of return.
This finding is in line with the results reported in Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007).21 These welfare
gains are around 0.4%. Second, in the two models with endogenous education, welfare gains
are higher than in the standard model because households are given an additional channel to
adjust to the time varying demographic processes by investing more in their education. Third,
welfare gains are lower in the endogenous growth/endogenous education than in the exogenous
growth/endogenous education scenario. The reason for this finding is that the decrease of the
automatically in different parameter values). In appendix A.4 we present the same calculations using the parameters from the
exogenous growth model with education, our “in-between” model variant, and thereby confirm that the qualitative results
do not change using these alternative set of calibration parameters.
21As further shown in Ludwig et al. (2007) using a stylized OLG model without social security and with exogenous
labor supply (and no education decision), welfare of newborns has to increase in dynamically efficient economies when the
population growth rate decreases. These results are reminiscent of the serendipity theorem of Samuelson (1975), see also
Michel and Pestieau (1993).
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rate of return and the corresponding increase in wages per efficiency unit of labor is lower in
the endogenous growth specification, cf. figure 3. Consequently, individual households benefit
relatively less from increasing wages in the endogenous growth model. Finally, in all models,
agents with low productivity experience higher welfare gains. This effect comes through two
channels. One is that agents with low levels of human capital receive proportionally more
government transfers through bequests than high ability agents. The second effect comes
through education. Agents with low innate abilities will initially choose lower education levels
but will increase their educational investment proportionally more than high ability agents.22
Table 3: CEV for Generation Born in 2005
Growth Scenario Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Education Yes Yes No
High 0.4% 0.9% 0.2%
Medium 0.7% 1.3% 0.4%
Low 1.1% 1.9% 0.7%
Of particular interest is also how the welfare of all generations already alive in 2005 will
be affected by demographic change. While newborn generations (and, more generally, young
generations) benefit from increasing wages (despite decreasing returns) we expect that the
lifetime utility of older (and thus asset-rich) generations will decrease because of the falling
returns on capital and the decreasing retirement income in our scenario with constant contri-
bution rates. The key question is then how the distribution of winners and losers varies across
the three model specifications.
These results are shown in figures 6 through 8. In the model without education (figure
6), basically only newborn and very young generations gain. Almost all other agents will
22This is caused by the higher elasticity of education w.r.t changes in capital per effective worker for low type agents,
cf. appendix A.3. Although the quantitative effects become small because differences in the slopes of the age productivity
profiles are small, this conclusion of course holds if we set all transfers to zero (i.e. isolating the pure ‘education’ effect) and
let households re-optimize.
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Figure 6: CEV for Exogenous Growth without Education
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experience a fall in lifetime utility. Agents around 40 to 45 will incur the highest losses,
at −0.7% because these middle aged agents suffer the most from lower future pensions and
decreasing capital income due to falling interest rates.
The results change remarkably if we consider the models with education (figures 7 and
8). There, the gains are more equally distributed with a much lower share of losers. Taking
the medium ability group as a benchmark, the age limit separating losers and winners shifts
up by 15 years. Moreover, the maximum losses are much lower, relative to the standard
model. There are two main reasons for these differences in results. First, the change in
interest rates and wages is smaller in the models with education. Thus, asset rich households
are relatively less affected by falling interest rates. Second, households adjust their optimal
education which is beneficial for welfare. Moreover, as the welfare gains of newborns reported
above, the variation of welfare effects across all households economically alive in 2005 are
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Figure 7: CEV for Exogenous Growth with Education
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Table 4: Distribution of Welfare Changes and Maximum Losses
Growth Scenario Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Education Yes Yes No
Percentage Winners 37% 39% 11%
Maximum Loss CEV -0.21% -0.36% -0.68%
lower in the endogenous growth scenario. Therefore, welfare losses for older and asset rich
households are also lower than in the scenario without the transmission of human capital. The
reason is again the lower relative price reaction in the endogenous growth model, cf. figure 3.
To summarize the information in the earlier figures, table 4 reports the share of agents
gaining and loosing and their maximum loss in terms of lifetime utility. We observe that the
number of agents with losses is roughly three times higher in the models without education.
In addition, the maximum losses are restricted to −0.21% to −0.36% compared to −0.68% in
the case with no education.
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Figure 8: CEV for Endogenous Growth with Education
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5.2.3 Variations in Social Security
In our analysis above we assumed that social security contribution rates are held constant
at their 2004 levels and that replacement rates of the PAYG system decrease such as to
balance the budget. Here, we examine how the choice of the future pension system affects
our results and focus on the other extreme scenario where replacement rates are held constant
and contribution rates have to be increased to balance the budget. As the two human capital
augmented models yield similar insights, we focus on a comparison between the endogenous
growth model with the standard model as the two polar cases considered earlier.23 As a
further sensitivity analysis, we also report numbers on the welfare evaluation for an economy
without social security.
From the steady state comparison in our simple model of section 2 we derived that we can
23Results on the exogenous growth/endogenous education scenario yield similar insights and are available upon request.
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expect lower long-run increases in the capital-output ratio (and correspondingly lower long-
run decreases of the rate of return), lower increases in education and thereby lower growth
rates in a scenario with constant replacement rates and increasing contribution rates. Table 5
reports the results of interest from our simulations. Compared to the scenario with constant
contribution rates (cf. table 2), the long-run growth rate is 0.2 percentage points lower. This
is the detrimental effect of taxation on growth. As a consequence of crowding out through
the pension system, capital-output ratios are lower and interest rates are higher but these
differences across social security scenarios are small in the endogenous growth model.
Table 5: Steady State Results (Constant Replacement Rates)
Initial Steady State (2005) Final Steady State (2300)
OADR: 0.17 OADR: 0.32
Growth Scen. Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous
Education Yes No Yes No
K/Y 2.78 2.71 2.88 3.10
r 7.9% 8.2% 7.4% 6.6%
γY/N 1.8% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8%
Note: γY/N denotes the growth rate of per capita output.
As shown in figure 9, the rate of return initially decreases stronger in the scenario with
constant replacement rates than in the scenario with constant contribution rates. It is only
after 2030 that the crowding out effects on private savings dominate and that the rate of
return decreases by less in the constant replacement rate scenario. For the standard model
this difference between curves during the observation period is small when compared to the
relatively strong effect between the social security scenarios under endogenous growth. The
reason is that in the endogenous growth model not only labor supply but also educational
decisions and thus productivity growth is affected. The higher growth rate of human capital
due to more education in the fixed contribution rate scenario translates into higher output
growth which keeps the capital-output ratio low and stabilizes the interest rate on a relatively
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Figure 9: Rate of Return (Constant Replacement Rates)
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higher level. Differences in taxation are now magnified through the additional reaction of
education. In terms of general equilibrium prices, the two models (exogenous and endogenous
growth) are therefore closer to each other when replacement rates are held constant than
under the opposite social security scenario which we analyzed in the previous subsections.
Consequently, differences across models in welfare gains (losses) for economically newborns
in 2005 are also not as pronounced as in the scenario with constant contribution rates (cf.
table 6). Due to the increasing contribution rates (and decreasing net wages) newborns expe-
rience welfare losses in the order of magnitude of −2%. Again, welfare losses are lower for low
types (not shown) and lower in the two human capital augmented models but, as expected,
welfare differences are not as pronounced as reported earlier. Furthermore, notice that all
generations alive in 2005 loose from the effects of demographic change under constant replace-
ment rates because of the increases in contribution rates. Comparing these welfare losses to
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the gains reported earlier exemplifies the potential benefits from reforming social security that
are especially high when households react by increasing their education.
Table 6: Welfare Evaluation for Constant Replacement Rates
Growth Scenario Endogenous Exogenous
Education Yes No
CEV0 Medium Type -1.8% -2.2%
Percentage Winners 0% 0%
Maximum Loss -1.8% -2.2%
We conclude our discussion on the role of social security by presenting results of the welfare
evaluation for an economy without social security in table 7. When compared to the bench-
mark scenario with constant replacement rates the detrimental effects of decreasing pension
payments on welfare of the middle aged are missing and this population group is only neg-
atively affected by decreasing returns on their retirement savings. Consequently, modeling a
social security free economy leads to an overestimation of the fraction of winners from de-
mographic change. This is especially true for the endogenous growth scenario where welfare
losses almost disappear.
Table 7: Welfare Evaluation without Social Security
Growth Scenario Endogenous Exogenous
Education Yes No
CEV0 Medium Type 0.8% 0.7%
Percentage Winners 74% 25%
Maximum Loss -0.02% -0.4%
6 Conclusions
This paper asks whether human capital adjustments play a significant role to address the
consequences of demographic change in the U.S. economy over the coming decades. We
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find that increased educational investments substantially mitigate the macroeconomic impact
of demographic change with profound implications for individual welfare. As labor will be
relatively scarce and capital will be relatively abundant in an aging society, interest rates will
fall but the effects will be much smaller once we account for changes in educational decisions.
For the U.S., our simulations predict that the rate of return will fall by only 0.2 percentage
points until 2050 with education, compared to 0.7 percentage points in the standard model.
We do not find that making growth endogenous has a large effect on relative factor prices
in the period of the demographic transition. Adjustments of relative prices are very similar,
irrespective of the growth mechanism as long as education is included. In the long-run,
however, we find that endogenous growth through human capital transmission will contribute
to an increase of the growth rate of labor productivity by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points.
We also document that the welfare consequences from the increase in wages and declines
in rates of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 1% in lifetime consumption for
newborns in 2005. These welfare gains for newborns however only come along if social se-
curity contribution rates are held constant at current levels. Households that have already
accumulated assets, on the other hand, loose from the decline in rates of return. We also
find that newborn low ability agents experience slightly higher welfare gains than high ability
agents. More importantly, we find that welfare gains are substantially higher in the human
capital augmented models relative to the standard model. The overall mass of agents alive
in 2005 that benefit from demographic change increases from 11% to almost 40% when we
move from the standard model to the human capital augmented models. At the same time,
the maximum loss decreases from −0.7% to −0.4% (−0.2%) in the model with endogenous
education (and endogenous growth). We therefore conclude that appropriately accounting for
endogenous education decisions is key for a quantitative evaluation of the welfare effects of
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demographic change.
Our analysis shows that reforming social security systems by reducing future tax burdens
provides important incentives for welfare improving accumulation of human capital. We have
however ignored other policy measures, in particular education policy, and we have only
focused on secondary and tertiary education. Furthermore, we have operated in a frictionless
environment where all endogenous education adjustments are driven by relative price changes.
In our future research we plan to investigate more deeply the scope for welfare improving
education policy in aging societies if market frictions may prevent such automatic adjustments.
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A Appendix
A.1 PSID-Profiles
Table 8: Regression Coefficients
type constant age age2 age3
high 1.534385 0.089528 -0.001656 8.76E-06
mid 1.090603 0.079985 -0.001476 8.07E-06
low 0.637634 0.068196 -0.001238 6.86E-06
A.2 Analytical Solutions of the Simple Model
Rewriting equations (23) for steady state education and capital stock gives
F1(k, e; γN , τ) = Ω(e, γN , τ)
1
1−α − k(49)
F2(k, e; γN , τ) = ck
1−α
1−ψ − e(50)
c ≡
[
ωξψ
γA
α
] 1
1−ψ
(51)
Ω(e, γN , τ) ≡ α(1− α)β(1− e)(1− τ)
γA[(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τ)(1− e)γNγh + ω(1 + αβ)(1 + g(e))] .(52)
Changes in k and e (holding τ fixed) caused by changes in γN are given by
(53)
 ∂k∂γN
∂e
∂γN
 = −

∂F1(·)
∂k
∂F1(·)
∂e
∂F2(·)
∂k
∂F2(·)
∂e

−1  ∂F1∂γN
∂F2
∂γN

where this is then
(54)
 ∂k∂γN
∂e
∂γN
 = −
 −1 11−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂e
1−α
1−ψ ck
1−α
1−ψ−1 −1

−1  11−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂γN
0

Solving the above system gives
(55)
 ∂k∂γN
∂e
∂γN
 = −(detJ)−1
 −1 − 11−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂e
− 1−α1−ψ ck
1−α
1−ψ−1 −1

 11−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂γN
0

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with
(56) det J =
[
1− 1
1− αΩ
1
1−α−1∂Ω
∂e
1− α
1− ψck
1−α
1−ψ−1
]
Rewriting the system gives
(57)
 ∂k∂γN
∂e
∂γN
 = −(detJ)−1
 − 11−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂γN
− 1−α1−ψ ck
1−α
1−ψ−1 1
1−αΩ
1
1−α−1 ∂Ω
∂γN

As we can rewrite (52) as
Ω(e, γN , τ) ≡ α(1− α)β(1− τ)
γA
[
(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τ)γNγh + ω(1 + αβ) (1+g(e))1−e
](58)
it can be immediately seen that for exogenous growth (γh = 1) ∂Ω∂e < 0 and
∂Ω
∂γN
< 0 holds. It
is also obvious that replacing γh with µ(1 + g(e)) does not change the sign of the derivative.
Hence it follows that det J > 0 and thus ∂k
∂γN
< 0 and ∂e
∂γN
< 0 is true for endogenous and
exogenous growth.
By linking pension payments to current wages (i.e. we hold the replacement rate constant),
the contribution rate τ to the social security system will increase as the society ages (see
equation 15). Since sgn( ∂Ω
∂γN
) = sgn(∂Ω∂τ ) we get immediately
∂k
∂τ < 0 and
∂e
∂τ < 0.
Unfortunately, repeating the comparative statics from above but letting the contribution
rate τ adjust does not allow to draw clear cut conclusions. This is because the decisive part of
the derivative ∂Ω
∂γN
= ( ∂Ω
∂γN
)D+ ∂Ω∂τ
∂τ
∂γN
has a negative part ( ∂Ω
∂γN
)D and a positive part ∂Ω∂τ
∂τ
∂γN
.
Thus, we can only show that the effect is “less negative” which implies that adjusting the
contribution rate has a dampening effect on the increase of k and e but we cannot determine
the sign any more.
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A.3 Elasticity of Educational Decision
In steady state, equation (22) for education can be written as
e =
[
ωξψ
γA
α
k1−α
] 1
1−ψ
(59)
=
(
ωξ ψγA
α
) 1
1−ψ
k
1−α
1−ψ(60)
The elasticity of education w.r.t. changes in k is given by
ηe,k =
∂e
∂k
k
e
=
1− α
1− ψ > 0(61)
Obviously, the elasticity η increases with ψ. Because in our calibration low type agents have
higher values of ψ than high type agents, they increase their educational investment relatively
more.
A.4 Welfare Evaluation using alternative Parameters
In this subsection we report the results or the welfare evaluation using the parameters obtained
from the exogenous growth model. Note that if we compute the CEV of the endogenous and
exogenous model without education using the parameters from the exogenous model with
education we observe relative welfare losses. This is not surprising because a rising β in
combination with falling interest rates (which is the case here) causes relative welfare losses.
The change in φ plays only a minor role.
Table 9: CEV for Generation Born in 2005 (Parameters Exogenous Growth Model)
SS-Scenario Growth Specification Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Education Yes Yes No
High -0.2% 0.9% -1.4%
Fixed CR Medium 0.1% 1.3% -1.2%
Low 0.6% 1.9% -0.9%
46
References
Aghion, P., E. Caroli, and C. Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (1999). Inequality and Economic Growth:
The Perspective of the New Growth Theories. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (4),
1615–1660.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. Econo-
metrica 60 (2), 323–351.
Altig, D., A. J. Auerbach, L. J. Kotlikoff, K. A. Smetters, and J. Walliser (2001). Simulating
Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States. American Economic Review 91 (3), 574–
594.
Attanasio, O., S. Kitao, and G. L. Violante (2007). Global Demographic Trends and Social
Security Reform. Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (1), 144–198.
Auerbach, A. J. and L. J. Kotlikoff (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A., A. Ludwig, and J. Winter (2006). Ageing, Pension Reform and Capital
Flows: A Multi-Country Simulation Model. Economica 73, 625–658.
Boucekkine, R., D. de la Croix, and O. Licandro (2002). Vintage Human Capital, Demo-
graphic Trends, and Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Theory 104, 340–375.
Bouzahzah, M., D. de la Croix, and F. Docquier (2002). Policy Reforms and Growth in
Computable OLG Economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 2093–
2113.
de la Croix, D. and O. Licandro (1999). Life Expectancy and Endogenous Growth. Eco-
nomics Letters 65, 255–263.
De Nardi, M., S. Imrohoroglu, and T. J. Sargent (1999). Projected U.S. Demographics and
Social Security. Review of Economic Dynamics 2 (1), 575–615.
47
Diamond, P. and J. Gruber (1999). Social Security and Retirement in the United States.
In J. Gruber and D. Wise (Eds.), Social Security and Retirement Around the World,
Chapter 11, pp. 437–474. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Echevarria, C. A. and A. Iza (2006). Life Expectancy, Human Capital, Social Security and
Growth. Journal of Public Economics 90, 2324–2349.
Fouge`re, M. and M. Me´rette (1999). Population Ageing and Economic Growth in Seven
OECD Countries. Economic Modelling 16, 411–427.
Fullerton, D. and D. Rogers (1993). Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden? Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and E. Renault (1993). Indirect Inference. Journal of Applied
Econometrics 8, S85–S118.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1991). Innovation and growth in the global economy. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hansen, G. D. (1993). The Cyclical and Secular Behaviour of the Labour Input: Comparing
Efficiency Units and Hours Worked. Journal of Applied Econometrics 8 (1), 71–80.
Heckman, J. and P. Carneiro (2003). Human Capital Policy. NBER Working Paper 9495 .
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and C. Taber (1998). Explaining Rising Wage Inequality: Explo-
rations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings with Heteroge-
nous Agents. Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 1–58.
Heer, B. and A. Irmen (2007). Population, Pensions, and Endogenous Economic Growth.
Working Paper .
Heijdra, B. J. and W. E. Romp (2007). A Life-Cycle Overlapping-Generations Model of the
Small Open Economy. Oxford Economic Papers. forthcoming.
Hendriks, L. (1999). Taxation and long-run growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 43,
48
411–434.
Huang, H., S. Imrohoroglu, and T. J. Sargent (1997). Two Computations to Fund Social
Security. Macroeconomic Dynamics 1 (1), 7–44.
Huggett, M., G. Ventura, and A. Yaron (2006). Human Capital and Earnings Distribution
Dynamics. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 265–290.
Huggett, M., G. Ventura, and A. Yaron (2007). Sources of Lifetime Inequality. Working
Paper .
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (1997). The Career Decisions of Young Men. Journal of
Political Economy 105 (3), 473–521.
Kru¨ger, D. and A. Ludwig (2007). On the Consequences of Demographic Change for Rates
of Returns to Capital, and the Distribution of Wealth and Welfare. Journal of Monetary
Economics 54 (1), 49–87.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary
Economics 22, 3–42.
Ludwig, A. (2007). The Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton Method: A Hybrid Algorithm for Solv-
ing Dynamic Economic Models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (5),
1610–1632.
Ludwig, A., D. Kru¨ger, and A. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2007). Demographic Change, Relative Factor
Prices, International Capital Flows, and Their Differential Effects on the Welfare of
Generations. NBER Working Paper 13185 .
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (1993). Population Growth and Optimality: When Does
Serendipity Hold? Journal of Population Economics 6(4), 353–362.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 98 (5), S71–S102.
49
Sadahiro, A. and M. Shimasawa (2002). The Computable Overlapping Generations Model
with Endogenous Growth Mechanism. Economic Modelling 20, 1–24.
Samuelson, P. a. (1975). The Optimum Growth Rate of Population. International Economic
Review 16(3), 531–537.
Smith, A. A. (1993). Estimating Nonlinear Time-Series Models Using Simulated Vector
Autoregressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, S63–S84.
Storesletten, K. (2000). Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration. Journal of Political
Economy 108 (2), 300–323.
United Nations (2002). World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. United Nations
Population Division. New York: United Nations.
50
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
08-48 Daniel Schunk
Johannes Binswanger
What is an Adequate Standard of Living during
Retirement?
08-47 Alexander Ludwig
Michael Reiter
Sharing Demographic Risk - Who is Afraid of the
Baby Bust?
08-46 Martin von Gaudecker
Arthur van Soest
Erik Wengstro¨m
Selection and Mode Effects in Risk Preference
Elicitation Experiments
08-45 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan
Tabea Bucher-Koenen
Anette Reil-Held
Christina Wilke
Zum ku¨nftigen Stellenwert der ersten Sa¨ule im
Gesamtsystem der Alterssicherung
08-44 Tabea Bucher-Koenen
Christina Wilke
Zur Anhebung der Altersgrenzen: Eine Simulation
der langfristigen Auswirkungen auf die gesetzliche
Rentenversicherung bei unterschiedlichem
Renteneintrittsverhalten
08-43 Alexander Ludwig
Thomas Schelkle
Edgar Vogel
Demographic Change, Human Capital and
Endogenous Growth
08-42 Edgar Vogel From Malthus to Modern Growth: Child Labor,
Schooling and Human Capital
08-41 Michael Ziegelmeyer Documentation of the logical imputation using the
panel structure of the 2003-2008 German SAVE
Survey
08-40 Florian Kutzner
Tobias Vogel
Peter Freytag
Klaus Fiedler
Pseudocontingencies in stereotype formation:
extending illusory correlations
08-39 Wendelin Schnedler
Adam Dominiak
Uncertainty Aversion and Preference for
Randomization
08-38 Susanne Abele
Sandra I. Vaughan-Parsons
Garold Stasser
Information Flow and Influence during Collective
Search, Discussion, and Choice
